in cost-benefit analysis, perhaps in accommodation to the public health environment in which she then worked, for public health experts excoriated the discount rate, seeing it as an untoward capitulation to mammon (Klarm an, 1967) .
M ushkin shares the predominant emphasis o f the economics liter ature on the measurement (valuation) o f economic benefits (Layard, 1976) . This emphasis pervades the writings o f economists criticizing the valuation o f benefits in water resources projects by the Army Corps of Engineers (Eckstein, 1958; M cKean, 1958) ; the papers and dis cussions at the two Brookings Institution conferences on the mea surement o f benefits from public expenditures (Dorfman, 1965; Chase, 1968) ; the two m ajor review articles (Eckstein, 1961; Prest and Turvey, 1965) ; the work by Dorothy Rice and the staff at the Social Security Adm inistration (Rice, 1966; Cooper and Rice, 1976; Rice et al., 1977) ; and the attem pt by Haveman and W eisbrod (1977) to reformulate the economists' approach for the m id-1970s. In almost every empirical study the economist recognizes that the economic benefits to be measured (valued) represent the value o f the difference in outcomes with and without the program in question. However, even as the importance o f determining that difference in outcomes is noted, measuring the difference is rarely pursued. Freeman's (1977) obser vations on the importance o f determining program outcomes are an explicit exception, but he does not perform here any empirical operations.
Economists agree that the economic costs o f a program are oppor tunity costs, which are not the same as accounting costs. Again, with a few exceptions such as Ju d y (1969) and Merewitz and Sosnick (1971) , they do not treat the calculation o f program costs as a serious problem and tend to neglect it when they do not dism iss it.
As a som etim e practitioner o f cost-benefit analysis in the health field (Klarm an 1965a (Klarm an , 1965c (Klarm an , 1974 Klarman et al., 1968; Klarman and G uzick, 1976) , I have drawn upon and profited from the rich economics and health-economics literature, but not without increasing m isgivings. These doubts have led me over the years to turn to costeffectiveness analysis, which is a truncated form o f cost-benefit analysis that stops short o f putting an economic value on the health status outcomes o f program s. My m isgivings fall under four headings, which are discussed in turn as follows:
1. Reconsidering the conceptual basis for valuing economic benefits. 2. Determining the outcomes or effects o f programs, which is the same as ascertaining the state o f the world with and without the program in question. 3. M easuring the economic costs o f programs yielding multiple outputs that are produced jointly. 4. T aking account o f the distribution o f program benefits and costs.
Problems in Economic Valuation
Cost-benefit analysis is the analogue in the public sector o f supplydemand analysis in the private market. In neither sector o f the econ omy is it the goal o f economic activity to maximize the national income. Rather, the goal is to maximize consumers' well-being. Thus, it is recognized that people may prefer to accept part o f the fruit of economic growth in the form o f more leisure or cleaner air, rather than more goods or services (Samuelson, 1980) . That is the reason for establishing intangible health benefits, such as avoidance o f pain or grief due to morbidity or premature mortality, as the third category o f economic benefits from improved health, in addition to the two sets o f tangible benefits-savings in health care expenditures and averted losses in earnings. In the empirical literature on cost-benefit analysis in health care, however, the measurement o f intangible ben efits has not received equal attention. Often its existence is noted and promptly disregarded (Fein, 1967 ). Alternatively Weisbrod (1961 assumes away the need to measure intangible benefits by positing that they may be held to be proportional to the sum o f the two sets of tangible benefits. I put a good deal o f effort into an attem pt to value intangible benefits in the paper on syphilis for the first Brookings conference (Klarm an, 1965a). The subsequent literature frequently cites this effort but does not repeat it.
The tendency in empirical studies to put an economic value only on the two sets o f tangible benefits has limited the direct applicability o f the findings o f cost-benefit analysis to public policy decisions. In effect, it is left to the decision maker to put a value on the intangible benefits. Moreover, if consumption is subtracted from earnings, as was sometimes done (for example, Laitin, 1956; Jones-Lee, 1976 ), the measured benefits o f a health care program for the aged are bound to fall short o f costs. M ost decision makers are not prepared to accept and act on the implications o f such findings (M argolis, 1977) . One solution has been to take earnings gross, without subtracting con sumption, on the ground that aged persons are full-fledged members of society (W eisbrod, 1961; Klarm an, 1965a; Jones-Lee, 1976 ). An other partial solution to overcome the bias o f market earnings in favor of men has been to bring into the calculations proxy measures for the services contributed by housewives. These proxy measures have under gone considerable elaboration and refinement particularly by Rice (1966; Cooper and Rice, 1976; Rice et al., 1977; Brody, 1975) . Still another approach, after noting the absence o f a quantified value for the intangible benefits, has been to treat the sum o f the two sets of tangible benefits as a conservative lower bound estimate o f the total value o f a program 's economic benefits (Goode, 1964) .
Because its criticism is conceptual in nature, the most serious chal lenge to the conventional and widely accepted three-category classi fication o f the economic benefits o f health programs came from Schelling (1968) at the second Brookings conference, although other theorists had apparently preceded him (Dreze, 1962) . Schelling doubted that a necessary connection existed between the expected earnings o f potential beneficiaries from life-saving programs and the willingness o f such persons to pay for the probability o f a small improvement in life expectancy. H e called them measures o f livelihood and the value o f life-saving, respectively. Further, he distinguished between a com m unity's ready willingness to spend very large sums on saving an identified human life and a population's aggregate will ingness to pay for a statistical reduction in the death rate. To measure the latter, he devised and administered a questionnaire designed to elicit such information from friends and colleagues. Done informally on a small scale, and evidently not with a representative sample of the population, Schelling's questionnaire provided a schematic outline of such an approach, not a systematic research protocol. W ithin a few years Acton (1973) applied Schelling's approach, along with the other approaches, in a study o f life-saving techniques for victim s o f sudden heart attack. Also within a short time span, Mishan (1971) endorsed and reformulated the willingness-to-pay ap proach for measuring the economic benefits o f life-saving programs as the only one consistent with the criterion of Pareto optimality for persons exposed to risks involuntarily. Finally, at the conference sponsored by M ushkin in the late 1970s, Nancy Dorfman (1979) demonstrated that, to the extent that earnings enter into the valuation o f the economic benefits o f life-saving program s, they m ust do so net of consumption by the beneficiaries themselves, since the pecuniary benefits are o f interest only to the relatives and close friends o f program beneficiaries and not the beneficiaries themselves. I f so, it follows that the sum o f the two sets o f tangible benefits-consisting o f savings in health care resources plus the averted loss o f gross earnings-may no longer be taken as a lower bound estimate o f total economic benefits.
A dilem m a is currently facing those who wish to measure the value o f economic benefits o f health programs. On the one hand, earnings, which can be measured and have been measured with increasing precision (Rice et a l., 1977; M ushkin, 1979) , may not be an appro priate component o f benefits and certainly are not if taken gross, before consumption. On the other hand, willingness to pay, which is accepted as the appropriate measure o f the value o f benefits, is extremely difficult to ascertain, for a variety o f reasons. One difficulty is the problem o f respondents' dissem bling their true preferences for a public good that is desired by many individuals, in the hope that others would pay for it. This general "free-rider" problem is aggra vated in health care by the tradition that nobody in need o f health care should be denied it for lack o f ability to pay; it has been doc umented that this liberal attitude is espoused by a wide range of political opinion, from left to right (Klarm an, 1951) . Another dif ficulty is that respondents to questionnaires generally do not know much about the mortality risks for their own cohorts, do not grasp the implications for themselves o f a small improvement in life ex pectancy, nor are able to respond rationally and consistently to ques tions o f life and death (Klarm an, 1974) , matters that we have tended to leave to chance or God.
In the economic literature a good deal o f the discussion o f how to measure the economic benefits o f health care programs appears under the heading o f shadow prices, previously defined (McKean, 1968; M argolis, 1977) . Shadow prices are to be used when market prices are lacking or require adjustment for market failure. By and large, substitution of a shadow price for an existing market price is dis couraged. An important problem in shadow pricing that cannot be escaped, however, is that o f the discount rate, also previously men tioned. The discount rate is a rate o f interest that is meant to equate the present and future values o f a dollar, so that a program 's expected streams o f costs and benefits over time may be rendered commensurate, thereby perm itting calculation o f the present value o f a program 's total net economic benefits. Unfortunately, economists disagree over how to measure the discount rate (Feldstein, 1964; Henderson, 1965) . In consequence, they frequently employ two or more discount rates as a form o f sensitivity analysis (Rothenberg, 1975; W eisbrod, 1961 . I prefer a single rate on the ground that it affords more definite guidance to decision makers, recognizing at the same time my inability to justify a particular rate, except on the rather tenuous basis o f wide usage (Klarm an et a l., 1968). In any case, it is fair to say that unlike the problem o f valuing economic benefits, the economists' controversy over the level o f the discount rate has not been a major factor in the lagging application o f cost-benefit analysis to health care programs.
The several difficulties in valuing the economic benefits o f health care program s, especially those with life-extending effects, are far from resolution. In tim e it may become practicable to obtain measures o f willingness to pay operationally; that prospect is in the realm of research. The outlook in health care is certainly brighter than in the area o f such a pure public good as national defense, where one person's consumption o f a good does not reduce another's. Meanwhile, the health scene has witnessed the widespread adoption o f cost-effective ness analysis.
Determining Program Outcomes
Mushkin brought the concepts o f cost-benefit analysis to the health field as an application o f developments in economic theory and em pirical measurement by economists (Mushkin, 1962; Mushkin and Collings, 1959) . D raw ing on the new welfare economics, the theory o f investment in human capital, and the economic studies o f water resources projects, she developed their implications for the health field independently, and before or simultaneously with the integration o f the several lines o f scholarly activity in the major review articles (Eckstein, 1961; Prest and Turvey, 1965) .
Simultaneously, Fein (1958) and W eisbrod (1961) were performing their studies in the measurement of the economic benefits of averting specific diseases. The first Brookings conference in 1964 commissioned a paper on some health problem or program (Klarm an, 1965a). The DeBakey Com m ission on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke requested some work on the economic costs of these diseases (Rice, 1965) ; while this work was in progress, it was reviewed by a panel of leading economists (Klarm an, 1965b). The major impetus to applying these methods of decision-making came with President Johnson's promul gation of the planning, program m ing, and budgeting system in the civilian branches of the federal government in 1965.
Leadership for this task in the Department o f Health, Education, and Welfare came mostly from persons transferred from the Depart ment of Defense, to which, in turn, they had brought in 1961 the methods of systems analysis developed at the Rand Corporation after W orld W ar II (Enthoven and Sm ith, 1970) . As practiced in the Defense Department, systems analysis differed from the economists' standard cost-benefit analysis in at least two respects: 1) the emphasis was on ascertaining the effects or determining the outcomes {not outputs) of alternative programs; and 2) given the presence of budget constraints on the one hand, and similarities among the outcomes of competing programs on the other hand, the focus of analysis became the measurement o f program cost in money terms and o f program benefits in terms o f physical outcome. In national defense no attempt was made to take the next step of putting an economic value on the effects of alternative programs.
It is worth noting again that discussions by economists of how to measure economic benefits dealt with which effects to count and which to exclude, in order to avoid double counting, and then with mea suring what had been properly counted. In the health field the at tempts by economists to measure economic benefits usually dealt with entire disease entities or diagnostic categories, and not with health care programs. It was as if an entire disease would be eradicated. If so, it would not be necessary to measure or put a value on the economic benefits of programs that served only to lower the incidence or prevalence of a disease.
Perhaps our historical success in the virtual eradication o f such communicable diseases as yellow fever in Panama and tuberculosis domestically served as precedents for an all-or-nothing approach. But other factors may have contributed to the economists' neglect of the practical problem o f determining the outcomes o f specific health care programs. One was that many economists treat the statistical method o f m ultiple regression analysis as a close substitute for a controlled experiment in the real world. This view seems to obviate the need for concern with problems o f research design and program evaluation, the difficulties posed by self-selection on the part o f program users, and possible biases in statistical analysis resulting from the use of aggregated, geographic data. Another factor was the economists' be lief, probably ill-founded, that health experts know the magnitude of the effects produced by the health programs that they administer or espouse.
In the first round o f policy analyses mounted in the U .S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1966) to apply the planning, program m ing, and budgeting system to health care programs, it became evident that the health care experts did not always have the requisite knowledge about program effects or outcomes. Since program analyses were linked to the annual budget cycle and had to be com pleted on tim e, it became the practice to arrive at program effects by consensus among those sitting around the table. N o doubt it would have been better for the development o f cost-benefit analysis and for its application in government if the lack o f knowledge o f program effects had been acknowledged and treated as a reason for recom mending that the requisite health services research be undertaken. However, linking analysis to the budget cycle was deemed an im portant objective.
In addition, the intellectual influence o f the earnings approach in estim ating the economic benefits o f health programs was strong within the department. Indeed, some staff economists believed that no program could be justified on economic grounds if its costs were not exceeded by the sum o f savings engendered in future health care benefits and the additional earnings o f beneficiaries. By contrast, the report of the ad hoc com m ittee, appointed by the then Bureau o f the Budget to study the federal government's responsibilities in caring for patients with chronic kidney disease, explicitly took issue with this view of economics. Recognizing that the purpose of economics is to improve consumers' well-being, the economist members o f this committee proceeded to apply the tools and methods of economics as far as possible (Gottschalk, 1967) . It turned out that it was necessary to stop short o f an economic valuation o f the outcomes o f alternative modes o f treatment. However, it was possible to compare the cost per added year o f life expectancy among the three then available or emerging modalities-kidney transplantation, hemodialysis at a hospital, and dialysis at the patient's home (Klarman et a l., 1968) . The rec ommendation to proceed with a combined program reflected the value judgm ent that it promoted the general welfare; many persons outside the committee disagreed with this judgm ent on the ground that the same resources could be better applied to improving the health of economically active persons.
In performing this analysis the economists enjoyed the unique ad vantage o f a close and prolonged association with a group o f preem inent experts in kidney disease research and clinical diagnosis and treatment. The clinicians were concrete in describing the patients, available treatments, staffing, and the way the characteristics o f the patients and technologies were changing. The economists were in a position to-and did-impose heavy demands for extrapolation from lim ited experience on the biostatistician-epidemiologist member of the Gottschalk committee, Bernard Greenberg. Such ready access to superb expertise in diverse disciplines is not normally available. U sually, economists have to rely on the willingness o f colleagues in the other disciplines to help them. The experts in other disciplines are not likely to see themselves as handmaidens to economists.
Despite the difficulties posed by interdisciplinary research, numerous cost-effectiveness analyses o f health care programs have appeared over the past decade that incorporate and integrate the contributions of the requisite disciplines (Bunker et al., 1977; W einstein and Stason, 1976 ; also numerous references in Fuchs, 1980 , and Office o f Tech nological Assessment, 1980). W ho exerts leadership in a particular study is a matter of circumstance; the design chosen for determining outcomes with and without the particular program is a matter of opportunity.
It would be slighting the potential capabilities and actual accom plishments o f modern economists to suggest that economists cannot perform proper evaluations. Although by training economists do not enjoy a comparative advantage over others, some economists have measured the effects o f natural experiments and others have partici pated in designed experiments in health care. Scitovsky's work over two decades at the Palo Alto Clinic is an example o f the former (Scitovsky and Snyder, 1972; Scitovsky and M cCall, 1977) , and W eisbrod's recent study o f alternative treatments for patients with mental illness is an example o f the latter (W eisbrod and Test, 1980 (Gorham , 1966) . H e observed that economic analysis was more helpful as a systematic approach to allocating resources among programs within the health field than among programs in health care and in other avenues o f expenditure. The intellectual status o f costeffectiveness analysis was enhanced when Acton (1973) published the results o f a cost-effectiveness analysis as a by-product o f his attem pt to perform a cost-benefit analysis. He recognized that all the mea surements required for a sound cost-benefit analysis, except one (the valuation of program outcomes), were already incorporated in the costeffectiveness analysis o f that program . When the additional step, that o f valuation, can be added, well and good; if not, the findings o f the cost-effectiveness analysis are by themselves useful for decision-making. Today I am inclined to go further. Economic valuation o f program outcomes without a valid determination o f such outcomes in the real world-I wish to emphasize here the distinction between a program 's effectiveness and efficacy in a laboratory setting-is but an idle ex ercise. Cost-effectiveness analysis is a desirable, if not necessary, pre cursor o f cost-benefit analysis.
Calculating Program Costs
The cost o f a program , as it appears in the equation of cost-benefit analysis, usually pertains to the cost o f resources employed in that program. Under conditions o f full employment in the economy at large, program costs represent the cost o f not employing the same resources in their next nearest opportunity, or the opportunity fore gone. However, as noted above, costs sometimes appear on the benefits side o f the equation as the total costs or economic burden o f a disease.
Sometimes cost appears on the benefit side o f the equation as the first component of total economic benefits, namely the potential savings in health care expenditures attributable to the program. The potential source of confusion here, it seems to me, is the focus on economic measurement o f the benefits o f public expenditures apart from a par ticular program. When the focus is on measuring the costs and benefits of a given specified program , the two streams o f costs and benefits are necessarily juxtaposed, and in this context costs can only mean program costs.
W ith few exceptions (Judy, 1969; Merewitz and Sosnick, 1971 ) the economics literature on cost-benefit analysis pays little attention and devotes small space to the measurement o f costs. It is as if the task were either self-evident or too simple for comment, once the notion of opportunity cost is accepted as the proper measure o f cost. The widespread injunction to measure costs, as well as benefits, in dollars of constant purchasing power is clear enough. When inflation occurs in the economy at large, current dollars are to be deflated by an appropriate price index. It is further accepted that expected shifts in relative prices are to be taken into account (Klarman, 1965a) . This adjustment can be made as a separate step or incorporated as a dec rement or increment to the discount rate.
A central difficulty in measuring program costs is that many health care programs produce several services jointly-inpatient and out patient care, services and education of health manpower, services and research, and so forth. When m ultiple services are produced jointly it is possible to calculate the marginal cost o f the service without am biguity, but average unit cost can be calculated in a uniform manner only by adhering to standard rules of accounting for allocating overhead costs. Although average cost figures calculated under such standard rules are not capricious, they are arbitrary and subject to change when other, perhaps equally plausible, rules are adopted (Klar man, 1950).
There is no general solution to this problem. In practice it is possible to narrow the range o f am biguity by reducing the variety o f outputs and m aking a program 's unit o f output sufficiently large. This is illustrated by the study o f the treatment o f patients with chronic kidney disease, in which the units o f outcome were taken to be hemodialysis for a patient for one year and all the preoperative and postoperative costs associated with a kidney transplantation (Klar-man et a l., 1968) . The aim was to avoid costing and pricing separately vast numbers and types o f laboratory and X-ray examinations and treatments by ancillary personnel. The wholesale procedure offers the obvious advantage o f reducing the volume o f calculations, but it also avoids the appearance o f a spurious accuracy that can be misleading.
Another problem in calculating program costs arises when they are projected into the future. In this process it is desirable to take account of the size o f the proposed program in relation to the size o f exisitng programs. Pointing to possible reduction in unit cost in the future is the effect achieved through learning by doing. Also pointing in the same direction are economies o f scale in the individual firm, if these are attainable. By contrast, pointing to a possible rise in unit cost is the effect o f diverting to the proposed program, if it is massive, resources employed elsewhere that may not be well suited for it. Also pointing to a possible rise in unit cost is entry into the program, as it expands, o f persons who are increasingly more difficult to diagnose and treat. In projecting program unit costs into the future, it is a matter o f judgm ent where to strike the balance between the opposing tendencies.
Finally, it is accepted procedure to allow for unemployment. In the presence o f unemployed resources in an occupation, industry, or region, it is appropriate to resort to shadow pricing and to adjust money costs downward, in order to obtain an accurate measure o f real resource costs. The fact that an agency's budgetary costs are higher than the adjusted amount has a bearing on who should finance the program but not on the calculations for determining whether or not the particular program is worthwhile for society to undertake (Haveman, 1977) . The adjustm ent for unemployment applies only for the period in which such unemployment m ust be accepted as an externally imposed constraint.
Concern for Distributional Effects
From the outset, cost-benefit analysts have recognized that public programs are likely to produce changes in the distribution o f income, consequent to their effects on the distribution o f costs and benefits. The new welfare economics, though rooted in the criterion of the Pareto optim um , recognized that the rule o f unanimity implied by it was not operational in the real world and opted for the modification offered by the H icks-K aldor rule o f potential compensation. Under this rule, a proposed program is regarded as efficient for purposes of resource allocation if it yields a surplus o f benefits over costs in the aggregate, so that winners could compensate losers (Haveman and W eisbrod, 1977) . That such compensation may not take place does not affect the determination o f economic efficiency.
But the absence o f actual compensation, despite the presence of potential compensation, affords no solace to losers. Indeed, Weisbrod (1977) has cogently argued that virtually every public program , what ever its objectives, has distributional consequences in the form of pecuniary benefits. In the standard cost-benefit analysis such pecuniary benefits, as well as transfer payments, m ust not be counted (Weisbrod, 1968 ). An obvious example o f distributional consequences, by no means rare, arises from an agency's budgetary constraint; in urban renewal program s politically influential losers, e .g ., landlords, are likely to receive compensation when the government's power o f em inent domain is exercised while sm all businessmen removed from the cleared area are not. N or will those who question the fairness o f the existing distribution o f income and wish to change it through cash payments or benefits in kind be impressed by the qualification that is conventionally attached to the Pareto optim um , namely, that it pertains only to a particular distribution o f income and that other optim a for the efficient economic allocation o f resources will correspond to other distributions o f income.
Clearly the tradeoff between a program 's aggregate balance o f net benefits and the same program 's effects on the distribution of costs and benefits is a value judgm ent or a political judgm ent, which the economist may be able to explicate but cannot decide. This problem can arise even in the absence o f economic valuation o f benefits. The reason is that a given average gain in physical measures o f health status may be appraised differently when it reflects small gains for everybody rather than large gains for a few. It seems to me that such a distributional effect may constitute the real, even if not the intended, justification for the application o f a discount rate by W einstein and Stason (1976) to the expected average gains in life expectancy by persons treated for asymptomatic hypertension. The point is that a given gain in average life expectancy accruing to a small proportion o f program participants reflects gains over a longer period than does the same average gain accruing to a large proportion o f total participants.
Conclusions and Prospects
The shift toward cost-effectiveness analysis in health care, away from cost-benefit analysis, can be justified on grounds o f usefulness in decision-m aking, today and for the foreseeable future.
M argolis (1977) has pointed out that the human capital approach to the valuation o f benefits is particularly lim ited in education and health. In education there are the political and social benefits o f having an enlightened citizenry. As for health services, M argolis believes that health is much more o f a consumer good than is education. W hile individuals are concerned about the loss o f working time due to illness, "pain, discom fort and the fear o f incapacity may be even more o f a basis o f w illingness to pay to avoid illness" (M argolis, 1977, p. 216) .
It is easier to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis when the out comes o f program s being compared are identical or at least similar along m ajor dimensions. It is worthwhile to invest in further research to ascertain people's preferences for and rankings o f diverse changes in health status (Berg, 1973) , an activity that Mushkin encouraged and sponsored in the 1970s (Chen and Bush, 1979) . It may turn out that preferences vary by age, sex, economic status, cultural back ground, and other characteristics.
One m ust recognize that cost-effectiveness analysis cannot provide rankings or priorities across diverse avenues o f public expenditure. To compare the worthwhileness o f programs between housing and health or between education and health it is necessary to complete full-fledged cost-benefit analyses. In turn, this requires the develop ment o f measures o f willingness to pay for all the programs being compared, not only for health programs (Clarke, 1979) . That is a tall order, and useful results are not imminent.
Meanwhile cost-effectiveness analysis, which has survived the demise o f the planning, program m ing, and budgeting system in the federal government, does afford direct help to decision makers in the public sector. Moreover, a well executed cost-effectiveness analysis points up the importance o f obtaining realistic estimates o f program costs and o f valid determinations o f program outcomes in the real world.
Finally, a well executed cost-effectiveness analysis can lay a firm foundation for a cost-benefit analysis. If the several elements that comprise a sound cost-effectiveness analysis are lacking, performing the additional step o f valuing benefits to complete a cost-benefit analysis is a fruitless exercise. Conversely, the discipline imposed by the process o f the cost-effectiveness analysis, in which program costs and outcomes are juxtaposed, assures that findings will provide help to decision makers today, even as greater help may be anticipated when the economic valuation o f benefits is improved.
